The popular approach to estimating the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (EMUC) (Chetty 2006, "A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion." American Economic Review 96 (5):1821-1834. doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1821. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.96.5.1821) is here extended by including household production. It is shown that this generalization of the model is important as omission of household production may lead to bias, as demonstrated in a numerical sensitivity analysis. An extended model with household production is used to derive new EMUC formulas. Empirical estimates based on current evidence of the included parameters suggest a lower bound for EMUC of about 0.9.
Introduction
The link between individuals' consumption and wellbeing is at the core of economic analysis, from both a positive and a normative perspective. One way to estimate this relationship is to study the tradeoffs people make between leisure and consumption. Here I suggest an approach that adds household production to this analysis.
The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (EMUC) is a means for measuring how utility changes with consumption and is of great importance for economic evaluation of policies. In, e. g., evaluation of climate change policies, EMUC is one of the most influential parameters in the calculation of the social cost of carbon (Anthoff, Tol, and Yohe 2009) . Using the Ramsey equation, discounting the costs of future disasters should account for both the pure rate of time preference and the growth rate of consumption over time; the two components are added after weighting future consumption with EMUC (see, e. g., Baum 2009; Di Vita 2012) . This weight can also be interpreted as the relative significance of consumption of current vs future generations, i. e., a distributional interpretation of the concept. In analyses of issues related to risk, the EMUC coefficient corresponds to a commonly used interpretation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Di Vita (2012) gives a succinct introduction to the development of research on EMUC. In the 1960s, an intense theoretical debate took place regarding whether EMUC is less than, equal to, or larger than 1. More recently, the focus has shifted toward empirical estimates. In a review of empirical studies of EMUC estimates, Evans (2005) reports estimates that are mostly in the range of 1-2.
While previous analyses used the pattern of savings or information about, e. g., the demand for food for approximating EMUC, Chetty (2006) demonstrated that observations of how working time responds to wage changes could be an alternative approach. He argued that if people increase their working time as their wage increases, on average EMUC is less than unity. Through the Slutsky decomposition of labor supply, there are two effects of wage changes on the demand for leisure: one income effect, where a higher wage increases income and leads to a higher demand for leisure, and one substitution effect, which increases the relative price of leisure at the margin and hence reduces the leisure demand. If utility from leisure is also independent of consumption level and if market work constitutes the only source of income, an EMUC value equal to unity means that these two effects cancel each other. If EMUC is less than unity, the substitution effect dominates (leisure demand decreases), and if it is greater than unity, the income effect dominates (leisure demand increases). Assuming that reductions (increases) in leisure demand are realized through working time increases (reductions), EMUC can be estimated from evidence on working time responses to wage changes.
Disa Asplund is the corresponding author.
The starting point of Chetty's approach is that the (uncompensated) labor supply elasticity with respect to wage is positive on average and hence the average EMUC is lower than unity. If, in addition to wage income, there is unearned income and consumption and labor are complementary, this upper bound is relaxed. He derived EMUC formulas under such circumstances and computed corresponding numerical values based on labor supply elasticity estimates, and concluded that the existing empirical evidence implies that EMUC must be less than 2: "The intuition for this tight bound is simple: if the marginal utility of wealth diminishes rapidly, why don't people choose to work much less when their wages rise?" (Chetty 2006 (Chetty , 1830 .
Here I propose an approach to estimating EMUC that is based on an additional basic feature of people's day-to-day tradeoffs as a result of wage-level changes. The idea is that individuals may respond to wage increases not only by adjusting their labor supply but also by reducing the time spent on household work or other forms of work performed without monetary compensation. For example, high-wage individuals can reduce time spent in household production by buying services from low-wage individuals. I argue that effective leisure time, rather than time not spent on paid work in the formal sector, is what is relevant when making inferences about the utility function. This is because an individual's labor supply behavior does not result solely from equating the marginal utility of consumption (times the wage rate) to the marginal disutility of (market) labor time, but also from comparing the marginal output of home production (which also contributes to consumption) with that of market labor. As a result, one cannot directly derive an individual's marginal valuation of consumption from her market labor supply elasticity, without regarding responses in household production.
The main aim of the present study is therefore to investigate how considerations of household production influence theoretical and empirical conclusions regarding feasible long-term, average values of EMUC. To this end, I extend Chetty's model by including household production and examine the implications of this generalization theoretically. I further derive EMUC equations for two special cases based on the wage elasticity of labor supply. One of these equations can also be used to estimate a lower bound for EMUC under more general conditions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the implications of household production on EMUC directly. However, there have been previous studies on the implications of household production on labor supply, which is a similar theme (see, e. g., Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright 1991; Apps and Rees 1997) .
The analysis is restricted to the use of intensive margin responses of labor supply, and I will not explicitly model intertemporal substitution of individuals.
1 Also, when it comes to macroeconomic data, the focus is on the long term. Thus, real business cycle and Frisch elasticities will not be addressed.
Moreover, the analysis differs from Chetty's final expression in an additional crucial way. Whereas Chetty uses the compensated wage elasticity in combination with the income elasticity of labor supply, I use the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply. EMUC estimates from this new specification are less sensitive to the magnitude of the assumed ratio of unearned income to earned income than in the previous formulation. In addition, this specification allows utilization of labor supply elasticity estimates based on other empirical sources -notably time series and cross-country data on mean working times and mean wages -for which it is possible to control for household production to some extent.
The main conclusion of the analysis is that when household production and market work can be substituted, omission of household production in an EMUC equation will generally result in biased estimates. Examples of this are shown in a sensitivity analysis of the differences in results with and without inclusion of household production. In addition, the sensitivity analysis shows that the results in Chetty (2006) are highly sensitive to the assumed ratio of unearned income to earned income. The main results of the present study suggest a lower bound of the average EMUC close to unity (about 0.9 at the lowest). In addition, I compute point estimates in the range of 0.9-1.6, but unfortunately these latter results should be considered more as an illustration of the proposed method than a final conclusion, since some of the underlying assumptions are based on estimates from one single old -and possibly biased -data source.
The next section starts with a description of the original model and continues with my extension of the model. Section 3 reviews the literature on the relevant parameters. In Section 4, results from the numerical analysis are presented and discussed, followed by some concluding remarks in Section 5.
Theory

Background
As is standard in analysis of utilitarian welfare evaluations, discounted utilities for intertemporal evaluations and decision making under risk, the following theories builds on the assumption of a cardinal utility function.
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In Chetty (2006) , an agent faces the following utility maximization problem during time periods:
s.t.
,where is consumption in period , is price level of consumption in each time period, is unearned income (endowment), is mean wage, and is a parameter indicating a transitory wage shift. is the time spent in market work (labor supply) out of the time at one's disposal in each time period . This means that market work is the opposite of leisure time and that utility is decreasing in market work when consumption is held constant. Chetty used a two-stage formulation to reduce expression (1) to:
where
1 1 + … + = .
and
He further showed that when = 0 and consumption and labor are additively separable in the utility function, the following result holds:
where is EMUC:
Chetty then broadened the model to allow for unearned income and complementarity between market work and consumption. He defined the level of complementarity between market work and consumption as:
This can be interpreted as the compensated elasticity of consumption with respect to labor supply.
3 Equation (9) in Chetty (2006) was the resulting expression of EMUC:
wherẽis the compensated elasticity of market work with respect to wage, defined by 4 :
Equation (5) consists of the following three factors: an unearned income factor, (1 + ), an income response factor, −̃, and a complementarity factor, 1/ (1 − (1 + )̃). Intuitively, the core part of eq. (5) is the income response factor.̃is unambiguously positive while is generally assumed to be negative, based on the assumption that leisure is a normal good, 5 and hence the income response factor is assumed to be positive. This factor is balanced by the ratio between earned and unearned income through the unearned income factor. Lastly, the possibility of complementarity (or substitutability) between market work and consumption is controlled for through the complementarity factor (the complementarity factor collapses to 1 wheñ= 0).
I will now review Chetty's results using both an extended model and updated data. The unearned income factor (1 + ) is obviously sensitive to small values of in relation to (as approaches zero, the unearned income factor goes to infinity). As I will show in Section 3, using disaggregate data, (proportionally) small values of seem more plausible than the values suggested in Chetty's study. I will further show that since potential substitution between market work and household production is not controlled for in the original model, both the income response factor and the complementarity factor may be biased. If so, it typically leads to an underestimation of the income response factor, whereas the complementarity factor can be both underestimated and overestimated.
Regarding the issue of household production, I will also consider the empirical possibility that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is negative instead of positive, i. e., that < 0. Through the inequality in eq. (2), this will have implications for the possibility to estimate an upper or a lower bound.
Introducing Household Production
I now define a model that is similar to expression (2) but that includes household production. The agent faces the following maximization problem:
= + + ( )
,where is consumption, is leisure time, is unearned income (endowment), is wage, is total time at disposal, is time spent on market work (labor supply), and is time spent on household production. ( ) is the household production function and represents the consumption value of total household production for the agent. It captures substitution between market work and household production through the following three channels: substitution between market goods and home-produced goods, labor division in household production (hiring of staff or work sharing with other household members), and investments in household production capital. I restrict the model by defining for the normalization 6 ( 0 ) = 0. Regarding the functional forms of ( , ) and ( ), it is assumed 7 that:
The focus is on intensive margin responses of labor supply and therefore I restrict the model to agents who to some extent participate in market work. From this notion and eq. (8), it follows that an optimal solution must satisfy: Figure 1 gives a visual interpretation of the optimization problem defined in eqs (7) and (8). The agent has time to allocate between leisure time, , market work, , and household production, . She first optimizes the proportion of household production in relation to market work, which will be the point where the slopes of ( ) and equate (equilibrium 1). She then chooses the optimal level of consumption in relation to leisure, which is at the point where the slope of the indifference curve equals the slope of (equilibrium 2).
I now put forward some propositions regarding solutions for the utility-maximizing behavior of the agent described by expressions (8) and (9) and regarding the estimator implications of that behavior. For a derivation of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1-4, see Appendix A.
Lemma 1 describes how the chosen level of household production is influenced by wage changes. This is important for the understanding of the mechanisms in the model and for the interpretation of the results later on.
Lemma 1:
The derivative of time spent in household production with respect to wage is the inverse of the second derivative of the household production function, and is therefore negative:
There are two limiting cases of eq. (13) w.r.t. ″ ( ):
Equation (14) represents a case of perfect substitution between household production and market production. In this case, there is no internal solution; instead either of the two corner solutions of 100 % household production or 100 % market work will arise, which violates assumptions (12) and assumption (13), respectively. The implication for an internal solution is that if the level of concavity of the household production function is low, a small increase in wage can cause a great shift between unpaid and paid work. Equation (15) implies that when the level of concavity of the household production function is high, the shift between household production and market production will be small and can be approximated to zero. Proposition 1 provides an estimator of EMUC in a model that includes household production.
Proposition 1:
In a model with household production, EMUC can be expressed as:
where: = + is total production time, = ⋅ is the compensated production time elasticity w.r.t. wage, where
The difference between eqs (16) and (5) is that, loosely speaking, household work is now also included in the elasticities that involve market work in Chetty's model. More precisely, when making inference about the utility function (with respect to tradeoffs between consumption and leisure), the relevant variable is how supply in total production time changes as wage changes, i. e., the relevant variable is = + rather than . Propositions 2a and 2b describe properties of the bias caused by omission of household production in Chetty's model.
Proposition 2a:
The error factor, defined as the ratio of the estimators with and without household production, is:
Proposition 2b follows directly from eq. (17):
If there is approximately no change in time spent on household production in response to a wage change, a model without household production will yield an unbiased estimator of EMUC:
In order to facilitate sensitivity analysis, it is convenient to split eq. (17) into two factors:
is the income response error factor and
is the complementarity error factor.
Proposition 2c:
The income response error factor is within the range of zero to unity:
Proposition 2c implies that the size of household production responses in relation to the compensated labor supply responses w.r.t. wage determines the size of the bias given by (̂) .
Proposition 2d follows directly from eq. (21):
The size of the percental error originating from the complementarity error factor, |(̂) − 1|, is an increasing func-
Note that in the special case when utilities from leisure and consumption are additive, i. e., 2 = 0, it follows that̃= 0 and (̂) = 1, and the relative bias of̂will reduce to the more convenient expression = (̂) = 1 + ⩽ 1, i. e., EMUC will be underestimated when household production is omitted.
Since the complementarity error factor, i. e., (̂) , generally is a rather complex expression, its implications will be investigated in more detail numerically in Section 4.1.
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Propositions 2b, 2c, and 2d show that an estimator bias arises if household production changes as wage changes. The interpretation is that the bias is driven by the share of the labor supply response that is caused by a counteracting change in household production, as a change in labor supply cannot be identified as a substitution between leisure and consumption. 10 Above, I have put forward some general propositions regarding household production. In the subsequent Section 2.3, I will derive formulas of more practical use, which I will later (in Section 4) estimate using empirical evidence (from Section 3).
New EMUC Formulas
I will now propose new point estimators for two special cases. One of these formulas can also be used to estimate a lower bound of EMUC under some circumstances.
Proposition 3 presents a formula of EMUC for the special case = 0, which coincides with the limit of a lower bound when either < 0 or the more restrictive assumption < 0 holds.
Proposition 3a:
If there is no change in total work supply in response to a wage change, i.e., = 0, then EMUC can be estimated as: Proposition 4 presents a formula of EMUC for the special case of additive utilities from leisure and consumption, i. e., when 2 = 0.
Proposition 4:
If leisure and consumption are additively separable in the utility function, i.e., 2 = 0, then EMUC can be estimated as:
Empirical Evidence for Parameter Values
This section reviews the empirical evidence for the uncompensated labor supply elasticity; for changes in shares of market work, household production, and leisure; for the compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. leisure; for the ratio of market work to leisure; and for the ratio of unearned income to earned income, as these are the parameters included in the formulas in Section 2.3. The empirical evidence on these parameters is summarized in Table 1 (the details can be found in Appendix B). When reviewing the results from the labor supply studies, it seems that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity w.r.t. wage is positive. However, these studies are often contextual, since they do not control for what the alternative to market work is. For example, for an individual who has housekeeping as her main task, and who has a market wage that is close to the price of such services, i. e., ″ ( ) ≈ 0, it is rational to have a high labor supply elasticity w.r.t. wage irrespective of her EMUC value (as indirectly shown in eq. [14]).
11 Since the underlying aim of many labor supply studies is to uphold the tax base when reforms are made, it is not a problem that the labor supply elasticity of an individual is high because she has the option to hire staff. But if these contextual values are used to make inference about the utility function, the results will be biased, as shown in Section 2.2. 12 An alternative approach I will make use of in the present study is to turn to long-term macroeconomic data, where bias due to work-sharing should be less pronounced. However, although the use of macro data may reduce bias linked to the omission of household production, it does not eliminate it. Even though work-sharing may be controlled for in the macro case, the problem of substituting household production time for household production capital remains.
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It is worth noting that Ramey and Francis' (2009) results suggest that, for the 25-54 age group, decreases in working times may be largely driven by an increase in women's participation rate. If the average wage is strongly correlated with women's participation, then it is possible that estimates of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity from the macroeconomic studies could be negatively biased. However, the long-run historical trend is not an increase in mean working time, even for the prime-age population, which suggests the relationship ⩽ 0. The analysis in Section 2.3 shows that in order to calculate a point estimate of EMUC based on labor supply responses to wage changes, household production responses need to be estimated, which is not necessary for a lower bound. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions on utility parameters from changes over long time periods as there may have been structural changes, e. g., due to changes in household production technology or in social norms regarding the division of labor within the household. In other words, the function ( ) is likely to have changed somewhat. This means that the point estimates are much less reliable than the lower bound estimates. 14 Ramey and Francis found that between 1900-2005 leisure time increased and both the household production and market work decreased for the total population, whereas for the prime-age population, the time allocation remained stable in the long run. The implied difference in elasticities between the total population and the prime-age population relates to partly different questions. The estimates for the 25-54 age group relate to within-time-period optimization of leisure and consumption, whereas the estimates for the total population roughly relate to lifetime optimization. Although the theoretical model in Section 2 is formally defined for lifetime optimization, it is not completely straightforward which one of them to choose. Thus, both approaches will be considered in Section 4 (estimation results).
For the ratio of market work to leisure, i. e., , one might think that it makes a huge difference whether = 0.25 or = 0.85. Fortunately, however, the proposed EMUC formulas are not very sensitive to when the complementarity between leisure and consumption is modest. For this reason, I will use = 0.85, based on core leisure only, for the main analysis. The rationale for this is that the share of leisure-related expenditures is used as a proxy for the complementarity between leisure and consumption, 15 and it is reasonable that only core leisure time influences the demand for leisure-related expenditures.
When it comes to the ratio of unearned income to earned income, , Chetty used the ratio of total capital income to total labor income in the United States (equal to 0.5) 16 because he argued that they should be equal at an aggregate level. 17 He further argued that the skewed distribution of wealth implies that < 0.5 for most households. However, in the present study, is calculated with more precision (and only for individuals participating in market work) for two select countries: the United States and Sweden. 18 There is a large difference between proxy estimates based on aggregate data and these new estimates based on more disaggregate data for the working population, especially for the U.S. case.
As a conclusion of this section, evidence from historical macroeconomic data suggests that uncompensated labor supply elasticity w.r.t wage is negative, i. e., ⩽ 0. The available evidence regarding the development of leisure time and household production is inconclusive, but none of the studies cited indicate that the time spent on household production has increased. The leisure expenditure share of consumption increased from about 0.03 at the beginning to about 0.08 at the end of the twentieth century in the United States. Over the last decades, the mean ratio of market work to leisure has been about 0.85 when only core leisure is included, and the ratio of unearned income to earned income has ranged from about 0.00 to 0.18 for the working population in the United States and Sweden. Based on these stylized facts, it is possible to derive estimates of EMUC, as will be done in the following section.
Results
In this section, I present numerical estimation results of EMUC -first in the form of a sensitivity analysis of Chetty's results and then in the form of point estimates and lower bounds based on the new model that includes household production. The section ends with a brief discussion.
Sensitivity Analysis of Chetty's Results
In this section, I present results from two sensitivity analyses of Chetty (2006) result, starting with the bias given by the complementarity error factor (eq. [21]):
I will here only present the core message of the sensitivity analysis of the complementarity error factor. The full results can be found in Appendix C (Table 4) . When the uncompensated labor supply elasticity w.r.t wage is negative, i. e., < 0, then the following relationship holds:
This means that the size of the error from (̂) will be less than 11 % wheñ< 0.1 and there is no unearned income, and it will be less than 2 % wheñ< 0.01 and unearned income is half of earned income.
On the other hand, in the studies cited by Chetty, was mostly positive and the values of were not
known. The sensitivity analysis shows that (̂) is well behaved close to / (− ) = 1, but when | | is small compared with | |, it becomes unstable, ranging from 0 to ±∞. From this perspective, it is worrisome that there is some indication that might be close to 0 ). We now turn to the sensitivity of Chetty's results with respect to the ratio of unearned income to earned income. When EMUC is estimated from the ratio between the elasticity of production time w.r.t. unearned income and the compensated production time elasticity w.r.t. wage, the formula includes the unearned income factor (1 + ). The occurrence of (1 + ) is unrelated to whether household production is included in the model or not, i. e., (1 + ) is included both in Chetty's formula (6) and in eq. (16), but eq. (16) is not used for empirical estimation in the present study. 19 In Figure 2 , the unearned income factor (1 + ) is plotted as a function of the ratio between unearned and earned income, . Numbers in bold denote the mean values of in the United States in the present study and in Chetty (2006) respectively. (17) are sensitive to small values of the ratio of unearned income to earned income (which are supported by empirical data compiled in the present study).
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From this perspective, it is recommended that formula (17) be directly estimated only with great caution and only if reliable and high-precision estimates of the ratio of unearned income to earned income are available.
Empirical Estimates of EMUC, Including Household Production
Based on the broad picture that emerges from the empirical evidence, it is possible to calculate lower bound and point estimates of EMUC using the equations derived in Sections 2.3.
Point estimates for the special case when total production time is insensitive to wage changes, i. e., = 0, coincide with lower bound estimates of EMUC when total production time decreases with wage, i. e., ⩽ 0, or when the more restrictive assumption that also market work decreases with wage holds, i. e., ⩽ 0. It is assumed that the ratio of market work to leisure is = 0.85 based on estimates of market work and core leisure from Ramey and Francis (2009) . 21 Estimates are calculated using Proposition 3a with various levels of compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. leisure,̃, and various ratios of unearned income to earned income, / ( ). Table 2 shows the results. That = 0 is suggested by the leisure development for the 25-54 age group in the United States in the twentieth century, according to Ramey and Francis (2009) . However, this is not supported by the parallel trend for the total population. The columns denote the ratio of unearned income to earned income, where 0.00, 0.03, and 0.08 are based on the median income of full-time workers in the United States over the years 1960-2014 (0.00 is the minimum value, 0.03 is the average, and 0.08 is the maximum) and 0.08 and 0.18 denote the lowest and highest mean values, respectively, for white-and blue-collar workers in Sweden 2003 Sweden -2013 . The values of are loosely related to observed shares of leisure-related expenditures in the United States in the twentieth century.
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In addition, estimates of for the special case of additive utilities between leisure and consumption, i. e., Table 5 ). There are two problems associated with the use of these data. The first is that the wage elasticities of labor supply used are derived from old data, 23 which unfortunately means that they could be biased due to diminishing productivity of work hours (see Appendix C). The second is that the observed estimates of the other included parameters are more recent. Interestingly, EMUC estimates from this analysis are in the 1.1-1.6 range, which corresponds well to EMUC estimates in previous studies (Evans 2005) .
Discussion
The results presented in Table 2 suggest that EMUC is higher than 0.9. 24 In the two special cases of = 0 and 2 = 0, EMUC is estimated to be in the 0.9-1.6 range. None of these results contradict Chetty's main empirical finding that EMUC is bound below 2. However, the average estimate in that study for the case when there is no complementarity between labor supply and consumption was 0.71, 25 which is below the lowest bound estimated here. This estimate was driven down by a predominance of micro-data studies. The two macro studies 26 cited in Chetty (2006) yielded significantly higher estimates (1.74 and 1.78), which are higher than all the estimates in the present study. Also, in the present study I have calculated the share unearned income for the working population with more precision -resulting in a mean value of 0.03 over the data period in the United States. Only updating from 0.5 to this new value in Chetty's original formulas would increase his EMUC estimates about 11 times, as can be seen in Figure 2 .
Conclusion
In the present study, I have extended the model from Chetty (2006) by allowing for household production. I have further shown that this generalization is important as bias may occur in its absence. In particular, if the observed compensated labor supply responses are partly counteracted by unobserved changes in household work, and if the compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. leisure is negligible (as was suggested in Chetty's study), a model without household production will produce a negative bias, which in turn will compromise the possibility to calculate an upper bound. This happens because substitution between consumption and leisure cannot be distinguished from substitution between market work and household production, which is a choice independent of EMUC. I have also derived point estimators of EMUC for two plausible special cases from which one can be used to estimate a lower bound of EMUC under more general conditions. I further have offered some empirical estimates based on current evidence of the included parameters where the lower bound of EMUC is about 0.9 and point estimates are in the range of 0.9-1.6.
An EMUC value larger than unity means that the marginal utility of consumption diminishes fast enough for extra leisure to be more attractive than extra income when wages increase. Even though a person who gets a raise can consume more, she still prefers to work less because the extra leisure is worth more at the margin. The present study has suggested a lower bound of EMUC close to unity, which is substantially higher than some of the previous estimates (including the mean estimate in Chetty 2006). The mechanism behind this result is that extra leisure can be earned without reducing the labor supply. The reason is that a wage increase can be spent in order to devote less time to household work. Obvious examples of substitutions of consumption for time spent in household production include the purchasing of a washing machine or a dishwasher. This means that an individual, whose EMUC value is higher than unity might still choose not to reduce her working time as her wage increases.
The above logic, on a basic level motivates why the value of EMUC should be higher than indicated by Chetty (2006) . This may have important consequences for the appropriate way to trade off current and future consumption, as a higher EMUC value implicates a higher discount rate as well as an increased impact of risk aversion and equity weighting when applicable.
One difficulty in estimating EMUC using the models developed in the present study has been to find unbiased estimates of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity w.r.t. wage. In order to obtain reliable point estimates of EMUC from the proposed formulas, new research on the effect of wages on total work supply rather than the effect of taxes on individual labor supply is ultimately needed.
As a last point, I want to address the possibility that the within-household substitution between paid and unpaid work might be of increasing importance due to increasing gender equality. As gender roles become less rigid, more tasks are socially acceptable to handle for both sexes. As more women participate in market work, the substitution between household and market work becomes more explicit. The implication is that the bias arising from a model that does not include household production, and that is estimated with individual data, might increase over time.
A Theory Lemma 1
Setting = − − , (8) can be rewritten as a maximization problem in , , with the FOC:
It follows that:
From this, we see that, for an internal solution, is dependent only on and hence independent of all other variables, for example or . Thus, = 0, which in turns implies:
Differentiating (28) w.r.t. gives:
Thus, ″ ( ) < 0 (from eq.
[9]) gives:
Proposition 1
Equation. (27) is basically the same equation as eq. (3) in Chetty (2006) . It allows us to follow the procedure given by eq. (4) in Chetty (2006) : Differentiating (27) w.r.t. yields: 
Differentiating (27) w.r.t. gives:
In the following, it will be convenient to define total production time as:
which means that:
which in turn means that the time constraint in eq. (8) gives:
Inserting (37) and (38) into (35) and solving for gives:
Following the procedure given by eqs (5) and (6) in Chetty (2006) , can be solved from the following expression (after simplification):
2 can be solved for in (40) by following the procedure prior to eq. (8) in Chetty (2006) : Consider an agent who faces the possibility of two states 1 and 2 with probability p of state 1. Consumption can be traded freely between states at a rate determined by p. The agent faces the following maximization problem:
,where , is the total income in each state, S:
where is the optimal level of household production time in each state and can be either exogenous or set at an optimal level. Hence, can be treated as exogenous when optimizing the level of consumption in each state. It follows that:
A first-order Taylor expansion around 1 gives:
Inserting (42) into (43) gives:
where is the response in consumption due to a marginal and fully compensated change in leisure. Inserting (46) into (40) (1 + )
Proposition 2
Equation (49) can be expressed as:
The equation corresponding to (45) using Chetty's original model is eq. (4), which can be expressed as:
which means that:̂=
Inserting:̃=
gives that:̂=
which can be expressed as:̂=
Let us now turn to (̂) = 1 + from eq. (21). Because > 0 and < 0, (̂) ∈ (0, 1] holds as long as > | |. The question that remains to be answered is whether it is possible that ⩽ | |. To answer this question, let us define the compensated total work supply as:
Using simple addition and subtraction, it is straightforward to show that:
Expanding (58) gives:
From (59) it follows that = 0 can only occur at the asymptotic limit, lim →∞ ( ) = 0 (and only if the numerator of (59) approaches zero faster than the denominator with increasing consumption). = 0 will therefore be disregarded in the following. It also follows from (59) that:
where the right-hand side of (62) is negative. The economic interpretation is that there needs to be a large degree of substitutability between and . In the limiting case with perfect substitutability between and , we have:
where > 0
.The second-order conditions are:
,where ″ is negative.
Then, if < 0, (64) inserted into (61) gives:
which does not have any real roots for . This indicates that (62) would represent an even higher degree of substitutability than for perfect substitutes. This in turn would implicate a concave indifference curve (see Figure 3 ). 
When = 0, (70) reduces to:
(66) gives:
Also, because < 0:
Proposition 4 I will now derive an EMUC formula given the following assumption:
FOC:
Inserting (29) into (77) gives:
Differentiating (76) w.r.t. gives:
B Empirical evidence
Uncompensated labor supply elasticity Evers, De Mooij, and Van Vuuren (2008) summarized 209 estimates of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity w.r.t. wage that were obtained from 30 different studies based on individual data from various OECD countries. A vast majority of the estimates were positive, but the ranges were rather wide, i. e., −0.08 to 2.8 28 for women and −0.24 to 0.45 for men. Moreover, as Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Evers, De Mooij, and Van Vuuren (2008) demonstrated, the estimation of such elasticities is a demanding task involving numerous potential pitfalls. For example, Evers, De Mooij, and Van Vuuren (2008) explained that "the standard model of labor supply does not distinguish between the effect of wages and taxes on the decision to participate (the extensive margin) and the decision regarding hours worked (intensive margin)" (p. 29). They further cited Mroz (1987) , who found that "when this effect is neglected, the estimated wage elasticity is biased upwards, because hours of work conditional on participation are relatively inelastic with respect to the net wage, while the participation decision is quite elastic with respect to the net wage" (p. 29).
At the long-term macroeconomic level, there are empirical indications that when wages in society increase, working time decreases. High-income countries tend to have shorter working times (excluding the unemployed) than low-income countries (see, e. g., Figure 1 in Morley et al. 2010 ). This observation is not new. In fact, already in 1957 it led Lewis to the conclusion that uncompensated wage elasticity must be negative. Burgoon and Baxandall (2004) and Huberman and Minns (2007) presented regression results of working time using mean income 29 as an independent variable for 14-18 OECD countries and time series data for 22 and 31 years, respectively 30 (with a difference of about a century between the two studies). 31 Both studies showed a significant negative relationship. Huberman and Minns (2007) provided estimates of uncompensated labor supply elasticity in the −0.11 to −0.16 range for the full sample.
However, none of these studies controlled for the diminishing productivity of workers with long working hours. Pencavel (2015) suggested that marginal productivity is rather constant up to about 50 hours/week for factory workers. According to; Huberman and Minns (2007) ; this threshold was passed on average (from above) around 1920 for all the OECD countries considered, which means that later studies of the uncompensated wage elasticity are more reliable in this respect.
Changes in household production and leisure
The theoretical analysis in Section 2.2 indicates that it may be important to consider household production if EMUC is to be estimated from labor supply response data. The studies concerning the development of household production and leisure are based on data compiled from various survey studies. A complicating factor is that sometimes the division between household production and leisure is not straightforward, e. g., when it comes to child care and education. Also, there have been structural changes such as changes in demographics (an older population with fewer children), dramatically increased gender equality (in both household production and market work, according to Ramey and Francis 2009) and longer average education.
Two recent studies of the development of Δ over time (as wages have increased) in the United States arrived at partly different conclusions, despite using similar methods. 32 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) , whose analysis was restricted to 21-64 year-old respondents who were neither students nor retirees, found substantial decreases in both market and non-market work and increases in leisure from 1965 to 2003. 33 Ramey and Francis (2009) , who estimated allocation of time for all demographic ages for the years 1900-2005, found the same trends for the total population as Aguiar and Hurst found for 21-65 age group . But contrary to common expectations, 34 Ramey and Francis found that the allocation of time spent on market work, household production, and leisure averaged over both sexes in the 25-54 age group was basically the same in 2005 as a century ago.
35 Table 3 shows the discrepancy 36 in leisure development between the two studies 1965-2003. The compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. leisure
No studies that estimate the compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. leisure, i. e.,̃, have been found. When it comes to the compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t. market work, i. e.,̃, the studies cited in Chetty (2006) showed very small if any signs of a relationship (i. e., they indicated that̃≈ 0). However,̃can be used as a proxy of −̃only if ≈ 0. Otherwise, the compensated consumption elasticity w.r.t market work needs to be adjusted by the ratio between the response in market work and the response in leisure, 37 i. e., / (− ), which in turn is hard to find reliable data on. One crude approach to approximating̃is to assume that consumption responses to income-compensated leisure shocks are proportional to the share of leisure-related expenditures (out of total consumption). When using this approach, it is also necessary to estimate what proportion of out of total leisure time gives rise to extra leisure expenditures and to insert only that part of the leisure into the ratio in expression (18) or (26). Vandenbroucke (2009) reported that the leisure share of expenditures increased from 3.0 % in 1900 to 5.8 % in 1950 in the United States. Weagley and Huh (2004) reported shares of expenditures spent on leisure of 8.1-8.6 % for near retired and retired people in the United States based on data from 1995. 38 In line with these statistics, e. g., Pawlowskia and Breuera (2012) 39 ; Thompson and Tinsley (1979) concluded that leisure expenditure is mostly a luxury good, and this might also indicate that complementarity between leisure and consumption might increase with increased income.
Ratio between market work and leisure
The ratio between market work and leisure, i. e., , in the twentieth century in the 25-54 age group in the United States is calculated using Table 2, Table 4 , and Table 5 in; Ramey and Francis (2009) . The mean ratio for the century is = 0.25 if all non-production time (including educational time, commuting time, and personal care time, e. g., sleep) is considered leisure and = 0.85 if we include only core (recreational) leisure.
Ratio between unearned income and earned income
In the present study, the ratio of unearned income to earned income, , is calculated with more precision than in Chetty (2006) , by using official data from the United States and Sweden. For the United States, the median is divided by the median (data from the U.S. Census Bureau) for each gender and year 1960-1968 and restricted to full-time workers.
turns out to be in the 0.00-0.08 range, with a tendency of higher values later in the period.
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For Sweden, mean is divided by mean (data from Statistics Sweden, Table) for five different worker categories and for each year from 2003 to 2013. 41 For white-and blue-collar workers, ranges from 0.08 to 0.18, and there is a tendency of decreasing in salary for a given year.
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The Swedish numbers are notably higher than the U.S. range. One reason for this may be that Swedish data are not restricted to full-time workers. Another probable explanation is that Sweden has a general welfare system that includes a general monthly child support of about 100 euros per child. Table 4 presents the values of the complementarity error factor, (̂) =
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C Results
Sensitivity of Chetty's result
for different values of the input parameters / (− ), , and̃. New estimates, additive utilities Table 5 shows point estimates of for the special case of additive utilities between leisure and consumption, i. e., 2 = 0, based on Proposition 4. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) . / = 0.5 corresponds to the case where child care is defined as household production, and / = 1 corresponds to the case where it is defined as leisure.
Notes
1 However, for the numerical estimation I will consider two cases where consumers maximize either lifetime or within-period utility. 2 Cardinal utility has long been considered outdated in most other branches of economic theory, since the idea imposes somewhat more restrictive assumptions which are not always necessary for economic analysis. However, already in 1936 Alt showed that relatively simple assumptions (accepted and used by some ordinalists) are sufficient to imply a cardinal utility function, and recently this concept has gained some revived interest among theorist (see Köbberling 2006) . 3 This corresponds to the consumption response due to a part-time unemployment shock that is fully compensated by, e. g., unemployment insurance. If a person wants to consume more in periods when she works more relative to periods when she has more leisure, there is a positive complementarity between labor and consumption according to this definition. 5 If leisure were an inferior good, the income and substitution effect would go in the same direction, making market work more attractive at the expense of leisure when wage increases. It is hard to imagine a case where this would be consistent with the past drastic increases in mean wages and simultaneous reductions in working times (see Appendix C). 6 The reason for the normalization is twofold. Most importantly, in the standard definitions of , only market goods and services are included in the consumption numeraire. From this perspective, the total value of the household production needs to be normalized to zero if EMUC values are to be comparable in size to the standard definition. The normalization also implies simplification of the model. 7 Some consumption (food) is necessary to sustain life, which gives lim ( , , ), where = + and = ( ), which is only partly tradable in the market. However, as long as g and c are approximately additive, this does not make a considerable difference, since ( ) is general enough to allow for extremely low substitutability between and for some tasks, which in practice means that these tasks will not be possible to substitute for market work. 8 Remember that = − ( + ).
9 Because the formula of (̂) is linear in / , an analogous analysis for (̂) would be trivial and will therefore not be performed. 10 According to Lemma 1, the size of responses in household production w.r.t. wage is in turn determined by the concavity of the household production function. As can be seen from combining Lemma 1 and Propositions 2b, 2c, and 2d, if substitutability between household production and market work is low then the bias will be small and vice versa.
11 This scenario, i. e., ″ ( ) ≈ 0, could explain why the extensive margin responses in labor supply are larger than the intensive margin responses (see eq.
[16]). A related possibility is that labor demand is not continuous, so that individuals face exogenous restrictions in the choice of working times, in which case household production offers a means to increase flexibility regarding total working times.
12 Also note that since both the models in the present study and in Chetty (2006) use a linear budget restriction, it might be that these models are somewhat unsuitable to estimate with individual data in cases where the individuals face non-linear budget restrictions due to kinks in the income tax scheme. 13 An additional issue is that GDP/capita is negatively correlated with the size of the informal sector (Ihrig and Moe 2000) , which implies an additional source of negative bias for the income response factor of the EMUC estimator. Informal sector biases might also be present in microeconomic data.
14 In principle, changes in productivity of household production is also relevant for the lower bound, but only if increases in housework productivity increases are of at least the same magnitude as the general productivity increase in the market-based economy, which I find unrealistic. 15 In turn, the rationale for using leisure-related expenditures as a proxy for complementarity between leisure and consumption is the assumption that sleep does not generate extra expenses and that the costs of commuting, personal care, and education are fairly inelastic w.r.t. non-production time, or at least marginal in size on average. 16 A similar method to estimate is to base it on labor shares, i. e., the ratio of aggregate costs of labor to total GDP, using the formula ≈ (1 − _ ℎ ) / _ ℎ . 17 Unearned income for individuals includes transfers, but on an aggregate level these are assumed to cancel each other so that the only source left is capital income.
18 These countries were chosen due to good availability of official data. The U.S. is important because many other estimates used in the present study are based on U.S. data. 19 The formulas used for empirical estimations in the present study are based on the uncompensated elasticity of production time, and in these cases is reversed so that the unearned income factor instead is (1 + ) and is thus not as sensitive to small values of . 20 Note that from the inequality ⩾ 0 ⇔̂< 1 + on p.1829 of Chetty (2006) , one could get the impression that EMUC estimates also in his final expression (eq. (8) in that study) increase along with the ratio of unearned income to earned income, when in fact the opposite relationship holds. In principle, this undermines the upper bounds of EMUC estimated by eq. (9) in Chetty (2006) . 21 The effects of = 0.25 and = 1 have also been examined, with marginal differences in results. For = 0.25, EMUC estimates are about 0.03 to 0.10 units higher and thus do not influence the lower bound. For = 1 (which represents the extreme value in the data set), EMUC estimates are 0.01 to 0.03 units lower. Also note that wheñ= 0, the value of does not influence the value of the EMUC estimates. 22 The maximum value was 0.08 in 1996. However, by including somewhat higher values, I allow for the likely event that the share has continued to grow, as well as adding some safety margins since the link to complementary is uncertain. Also,̃= 0.15 was the maximum value used in Chetty (2006) , so including̃= 0.15 facilitates comparison between studies.
23 One positive aspect of this is that complementarity between leisure and consumption was probably negligible at this time (leisure expenditure as a share of consumption was low around year 1900 according to Vandenbroucke 2009) , which implies that , ≈ 0 is a reasonable approximation. 24 It is worth noting that Table 2 suggests that the lower bound of EMUC is close to unity, which is the central value used in several important recent CBA applications, including the Stern Review (Stern 2007 ) and the UK Treasury (according to Evans 2006) . 25 The mean estimate of 0.71 is low compared with the EMUC estimates in former studies (Evans 2005) , but Chetty did not relate at all to the previous EMUC literature. His aim was instead to show that his EMUC estimates did not support an expected utility-based formulation of risk aversion. 26 However, these two studies suffered from multiple problems. The most serious is that they looked at responses to income tax changes and not wage changes. On a macroeconomic level, tax changes do not only influence labor supply responses through net wage, but, again, through division of work where higher taxes will lead to a higher degree of unpaid work and a larger informal sector. In addition, the two studies were not peer reviewed and were based on partly the same data.
